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ABSTRACT
Thomas  Hofweber's  well-known  ontological  project  crucially  involves  inferring  negative 
existential statements from statements of non-reference, i.e. statements that say that some term 
or terms do not refer. Here, after explaining the context of this move, I aim to show that it is 
fallacious, and that this vitiates Hofweber's ontological project.
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Thomas Hofweber has for several years been developing a distinctive approach to ontological and 
metaontological questions.
One of his starting points is the way some ontological questions in philosophy can apparently be 
settled with trivial arguments - for example, since mathematics has established that there are 
infinitely many prime numbers, it follows that there are numbers, and so there is no room for a 
special philosophical discipline of ontology (if it is to respect mathematics) to deal with this as a 
substantial question, the way ontologists of mathematics seem to try to do. Call this the puzzle 
about ontology.
Hofweber attempts to solve the puzzle about ontology by independently motivating a distinction 
between two different readings of quantifiers, or two sorts of quantification: internal and external. 
Internal quantificational statements, unlike external ones, do not work by placing conditions on a 
domain of objects. (To see that we might need something like this, consider the quantifier in 'Santa 
Claus doesn't exist, therefore there is something that doesn't exist'.) He then argues that the trivial 
arguments go through, but only when the quantifiers are given an internal reading. Give the 
quantifiers an external reading, and it is not clear that their premises have been established - in the 
case of 'There are infinitely many prime numbers', for instance, it might be that mathematics has 
established this on its internal reading, but not on its external reading.
Hofweber doesn't just want to solve the puzzle about ontology with his internal/external distinction, 
however. He also wants to use it to establish answers to certain (external) ontological questions - 
negative answers. This is what I call Hofweber's ontological project.
Taking the number case, the project goes roughly like this. Hofweber argues that, if we can establish 
internalism about number-talk, including arithmetic (i.e. if we can establish that the quantifiers 
involved in number-talk, including arithmetic, are internal ones which do not place conditions on a 
domain of objects), we can show that the external question of whether numbers exist is left open by 
this talk, and is thus free for the taking by ontology.
Next, Hofweber argues that numerals, number words like 'four', and terms like 'the number 2' are 
not referring terms. I.e., that they are not in the business of referring to things. They sometimes 
assume the superficial grammatical position of referring terms for sophisticated linguistic reasons 
involving the notion of a 'focus construction' (and other considerations, depending on the kind of 
occurrence).
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Then, on the basis that number terms don't refer, Hofweber concludes (via a principle designed to 
enable one to infer non-existence of things from statements of non-reference) that numbers don't 
exist, i.e. that there are no numbers (the quantifier here being intended externally), thus answering 
one of ontology's fundamental questions. I will good-naturedly call this last step 'the Howler'.
I have previously argued (Haze (2011)) that Hofweber's distinction between internal and external 
quantification is ill-motivated. Here, I grant that distinction, and even grant that it enables Hofweber 
to explain the validity of the trivial arguments.
I want to make it clear that the Howler is a fallacious move, and that this vitiates Hofweber's project 
for answering certain ontological questions (e.g. about numbers, properties and propositions) in the 
negative. I will not be concerned here with whether Hofweber succeeds in establishing internalism 
about number-talk - my point is only that his argument from internalism to negative answers in 
ontology contains a fallacy.
The Howler appears in Hofweber's (2009) contribution to the recent influential anthology on 
metametaphysics. (I include other relevant papers in the bibliography, to help readers piece together 
a more detailed view of Hofweber's overall project, but he gives a good sense of it in the paper just 
mentioned.)
I think my criticism will be most effective if I quote the Howler along with the argument in which it 
appears, rather than reconstructing it and insisting that that is what Hofweber was doing. Here is the 
argument:
Let’s briefly reflect on what seems to be a central thesis about reference or denotation:
(REF) If Fred exists then ‘Fred’ refers to Fred.
Of course, I am assuming that ‘Fred’ is unambiguous, or at least used in the same way 
throughout. (REF) is uncontroversial, I take it, and probably a conceptual truth. Note 
that it implies the following:
(REF ) If ‘Fred’ doesn’t refer to Fred then Fred doesn’t exist.∗
There are two ways for an expression not to refer. One is to aim to refer, but not to 
succeed. A classic case of this are empty names. Although the details of any example 
one might try to give of this are controversial, let’s nonetheless take ‘Sherlock’ to be an 
empty name of this kind. That is, suppose Sherlock is a name and thus has the semantic 
function of picking out an object. But it fails in carrying out that function. It thus 
doesn’t succeed in referring, and thus doesn’t refer. Thus Sherlock does not exist. 
Nothing in the world is Sherlock, no matter what in general the world contains. There 
could be all kinds of people, with all kinds of professions, but no matter how general 
properties are instantiated in the world, nothing in it is Sherlock. And nothing could be. 
If ‘Sherlock’ does not refer then Sherlock does not exist. This is all fairly trivial, but I 
go over it to make it vivid for our next case. 
Names aim to refer, but they can fail to succeed in what they aim for. The second way 
in which an expression might not refer is when it does not even aim to refer. Non-
referential expressions, like ‘very’, don’t refer since they don’t even aim to refer. If 
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internalism is correct about talk about numbers, properties, and propositions, then the 
relevant singular terms are non-referential. They do not aim to refer, and thus they do 
not refer. According to the above version of internalism ‘two’ is just like ‘most’. But 
since it doesn’t refer we know that there is no such thing as the number two. Since 
‘two’ and ‘the number two’ are non-referring expressions nothing out there is (or can 
be) the number two. There can be all kinds of objects, abstract or concrete, they can 
have all kinds of properties and relations to each other. Nonetheless, none of them is 
(or can be) the number two. Or any of the other numbers. Internalism thus answers the 
ontological question. (Hofweber 2009, p. 285.)
Note first that Hofweber says that '[a]ccording to the above version of internalism "two" is just like 
"most"'. But what do we get if we substitute 'most' for 'Fred' in Hofweber's (REF*) principle?:
(REF*-Most) If 'most' doesn't refer to most then most doesn't exist.
But this seems like ungrammatical nonsense. Furthermore, it doesn't seem that 'Does most exist?' or 
'Is there such a thing as most?' are substantial, sensible questions. It may be argued that 'Does most 
exist? No.' is not complete gibberish, if it is construed as a kind of metalinguistic point - it's not true 
to say 'Most exists'. This question-and-answer does not appear to be about whether the domain of 
our external quantifiers meets certain genuine conditions (and not simply metalinguistic conditions 
such as 'being referred to by the word "most"').
So if 'two' really is just like 'most' in all relevant respects, Hofweber has a problem. There is, of 
course, an important difference. Consider:
(REF*-Two) If 'the number two' doesn't refer to the number two then the number two 
doesn't exist.
Unlike (REF*-Most), (REF*-Two) is superficially grammatical. It even appears not to be nonsense 
(if we consider it independently of Hofweber's views). Do either of these two differences help?
Superficial grammaticality doesn't help; consider the nonsensical but superficially grammatical 
question 'Does the rock of eggs exist?'. This doesn't seem to turn on whether a domain of objects 
meets some genuine condition. Insofar as we are going to answer it, we are going to answer 'No.', 
and like the 'most' case, this answer can only amount to a metalinguistic point: there is nothing 
referred to by 'the rock of eggs'. So, we may allow and respond to the question, as phrased, as a 
matter of politeness so to speak. And if we are more likely to do this in the present case than in the 
'most' case, then this is only because the question in the present case more closely resembles a 
sensical one. But intuitively it is not what one would call a substantial question, which is what 
Hofweber needs the question about the number two to be.
The appearance of sense doesn't help either, for Hofweber has no way of explaining it except in 
terms of internalism; he explains occurrences of number-expressions always in terms of their being 
non-referring terms that appear in the syntactic guise of referring terms (for sophisticated linguistic 
reasons). And it is not at all clear what these could be doing in a context like 'There is no ...' where 
‘There is’ is an external quantifier.
In general, the point might be captured by the following principle: non-existence of something only 
follows by semantic descent from non-reference when the non-referring term plays the semantic role  
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of referring. Otherwise you can't semantically descend to a well-formed, sensical proposition.
(This is a necessary condition for the non-existence of something following by semantic descent 
from non-reference, but it may not be sufficient. I say 'follows by semantic descent' rather than 
simply 'follows' because '"X" does not refer' may be argued to always imply 'The referent of "X" 
does not exist' - but there is no semantic descent there, as there is in Hofweber's arguments.)
This seems like the natural view, in lieu of some special story, and Hofweber hasn't given any such 
story. I conclude that here we have a problem for Hofweber's ontological project.
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